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Jasmine Armand*
Abstract:
In 1804, the Caribbean island of Haiti became the first black republic in the world
after leading the only successful slave rebellion in history to result in the
formation of an independent nation. Overflowing with valuable natural resources
and equipped with a strategic Caribbean location, Haiti was positioned to remain
one of the most prosperous territories in the world. But the price of independence
was steep, and the country failed to thrive under crushing foreign intervention.
But its story does not end there.
This note examines the opportunities for Haiti to establish economic
independence through public-private partnerships and foreign direct
investments. First, this note will recount Haiti’s complicated past, from the native
Taino Indians, the commencement of African slavery, to the historic slave
rebellion and the fight for independence which elicited extreme backlash from the
Western world. Next, this note will take an in-depth look at Brazil’s recent
anticorruption success and apply those lessons to Haiti. By firmly addressing its
own corruption issue, Haiti can create an environment that is welcoming to
foreign investors, paving the way for transformative public-private partnerships.
This note will then address the characteristics of an effective public-private
partnership (P3)—a mechanism by which a government can partner with the
private sector to fund and operate key infrastructures and stimulate economic
development. Haiti’s lack of essential structure makes it ripe with opportunities
for P3s in virtually every industry—water, sanitation, electricity, internet,
transportation, education, and more. Developing this infrastructure will not only
stabilize daily life for Haiti’s citizens but it can begin to attract foreign investors.
As such, this note will explain the role of foreign direct investments (FDIs) in
strengthening and expanding Haiti’s economy. In addition to injecting capital
*
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into the country, FDIs can also help Haiti develop its human capital by providing
jobs and skill training.
This note proposes that through the development of essential infrastructure via
P3s and the expansion of the economy with FDIs, Haiti can begin to establish
economic independence and take its rightful place in the global economy.
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I.

INTRODUCTION
A strikingly beautiful island country brimming with tropical trees,
sprawling mountain ranges, and sandy beaches that blend seamlessly into the
clear Caribbean Sea, the Republic of Haiti is a historic nation of endless
possibilities. Troubled by centuries of international interference and
debilitating infighting, Haiti is currently and most commonly known as “the
poorest country in the Western Hemisphere.”1 However, once globally
renowned as “[t]he Pearl of the Antilles,”2 Haiti was never inherently
impoverished. Its current economic condition was strategically and
deliberately imposed through centuries of external military influence,
unfavorable international trade laws and practices, and intentional
government destabilization.3
In order to become a thriving and economically independent nation, one
that is not nearly eighty percent dependent on foreign aid, Haiti will have to
transform itself in a minimum of three ways. First, essential infrastructure
such as roads, sanitation, electricity, and transportation must be established,
ideally through public-private partnerships (P3s) to make up for the lack of
internal capital. Next, regulations and laws must be created and properly
enforced in order to ensure the stability and protection of both foreign and
domestic investments. This includes thorough anti-corruption legislation to
regulate not just international participation but domestic private companies,
which have crippled key sectors through their corrupt practices.4 Finally,
with regulation and key infrastructure in place, Haiti would be ready for the
third and key step to its economic development: foreign direct investments
(FDIs). FDIs will build up the private sector and create jobs, in turn training
Haiti’s vast but untapped labor force.
Though the invitation of private investors sounds contrary to economic
independence, it is the first step to stabilizing the economy to the point of
independence, something the country has not seen in decades, if ever. The
debilitated conditions of Haiti’s domestic infrastructure and the level of
foreign aid currently provided by the United States5 create a climate that is
ready for global companies to answer the country’s call for private foreign
investors. The steady and continuous flow of knowledge and funds typical of
FDIs would help bolster Haiti’s local economy while further strengthening
their foothold in both the Caribbean and world economy. Haiti is open for
1
CIA, CENTRAL AMERICA: HAITI, THE WORLD FACTBOOK, https://www.cia.gov/library/
publications/the-world-factbook/geos/print_ha.html (last visited Feb. 4, 2019).
2
MICHAEL S. VANHOOK, THE PEARL OF THE ANTILLES: A HISTORY OF HAITI 4 (2019).
3
Rocio Cara Labrador, Haiti’s Troubled Path to Development, GLOBAL TRADE (Apr.
1 3 , 2 0 1 8 ) , http://www.globaltrademag.com/uncategorized/haitis-troubled-path-to
-development.
4
MARTHA N. KELLEY, OECD, ASSESSING THE INVESTMENT CLIMATE IN HAITI: POLICY
CHALLENGES, 2 (2001), http://www.oecd.org/industry/inv/investmentstatisticsandanalysis/
1897610.pdf.
5
See CIA, supra note 1.
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business.
The following argument will detail: 1) Haiti’s political and economic
history and its demonstrated need for consistent and regulated foreign
investors, 2) the U.S. legislation currently upholding trade law to Haiti, 3)
the opportunities for infrastructure to be developed through P3s, 4) lessons
to be learned from Brazil on effective anti-corruption reform, and 5)
opportunities for and benefits of FDIs in Haiti on a local, Caribbean, and
global economic scale.
II. PAST AND PRESENT FOREIGN INTERFERENCE IN HAITI
A. Haiti’s Political and Economic History
Haiti’s native Taino Indians were virtually annihilated shortly after
Christopher Columbus’s 1492 arrival on the island of Hispaniola.6 The brutal
slavery and oppression of the Taino people led Columbus’s fellow settler
Bartolomé de Las Casas (“Protector of the Indians”) to suggest the
importation of African slaves as an alternative to enslaving the native Taino
Indians7 since Africans were believed to be stronger.8 Some consider this to
be the beginning of the transatlantic slave trade in the New World.9
Haiti was wealthy with natural resources, including sugarcane, organic
tropical fruits, coffee, oil and natural gas, gold, copper,10 bauxite, calcium
carbonate, marble, hydropower, and arable land.11 In order to harvest the
copious resources of the island, France—the new owners of a third of
Hispaniola—increased their importation and subsequent brutalization of
African slaves.12 Focusing on sugar and forestry related industries for their
trade,13 Saint Domingue—the French name for the island—soon became
France’s most profitable colony.14
6

See VANHOOK, supra note 2, at 9.
Id. at 10.
8
Dani Anthony, July 2015: Bartolomé de las Casas and 500 Years of Racial Injustice,
ORIGINS: CURRENT EVENTS IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE, http://origins.osu.edu/milestones/
july-2015-bartolom-de-las-casas-and-500-years-racial-injustice, (last visited Mar. 11, 2020).
9
Sylvia Wynter, New Seville and the Conversion Experience of Bartolomé de Las Casas,
JAM. J., May 1984, at 25, 25, https://ufdc.ufl.edu/UF00090030/00043/27j.
10 Benjamin Elisha Sawe, What Are The Major Natural Resources Of Haiti?,
WORLDATLAS (Jan. 17, 2019), https://www.worldatlas.com/articles/what-are-the-majornatural-resources-of-haiti.html.
11 CIA, supra note 1.
12 See VANHOOK, supra note 2, at 10-12.
13 CIA, supra note 1.
14 Id. (“The French colony, based on forestry and sugar-related industries, became one of
the wealthiest in the Caribbean but relied heavily on the forced labor of enslaved Africans and
environmentally degrading practices.”); H.P. DAVIS, BLACK DEMOCRACY: THE STORY OF
HAITI 23 (photo. reprint 2007) (Longmans, Green & Co 1928) (“From the middle of the
eighteenth century to the French Revolution was a period of increasing and unexampled
prosperity, French St.-Domingue being counted the richest colonial possession in the world.”).
7
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After three centuries of African slavery on the island, Haiti became an
independent nation in 1804 following a historic slave rebellion.15 The young
nation changed its name from Saint Domingue to its Taino name of Ayiti or
Haiti meaning “Land of High Mountains.”16 This historic victory made Haiti
the first black republic in the world.17
Haiti’s extraordinary feat marked a shift in global politics and world
affairs, almost immediately changing the course of history for one future
world superpower—the United States. France’s clandestine and renewed
ownership of New Orleans and the potential for French interference instilled
great fear in then-President Thomas Jefferson, who wrote to his U.S. Minister
to France Robert Livingston, “[t]he day that France takes possession of New
Orleans . . . we must marry ourselves to the British fleet and nation.”18
Jefferson then sent Livingston to negotiate the purchase of New Orleans.19
Under Napoleon Bonaparte, France had revived its vision of a French
Empire in the New World.20 However, Bonaparte’s inability to defeat Haiti’s
unrelenting slave revolt left France’s position severely weakened.21 When
Livingston arrived to negotiate the purchase of Louisiana, France shocked
the United States by offering the entirety of the Louisiana Territory for sale.22
The slave revolt, still one year from its completion, was formidable enough
to be one of the main contributing factors of the 1803 sale of more than
828,000 square miles of land for $15 million—essentially doubling the
United States’ size for only three cents per acre.23 The purchased land
contained a part or whole of 15 future states, thus becoming a landmark of
Jefferson’s presidency and a turning point for the United States’ expansion
into the West.24
However, Haiti’s multifaceted triumph and contribution to the global
landscape was hardly received as such. Despite becoming an independent
nation in 1804, it was not recognized as a country by the United States until
nearly sixty years later in 1862.25 During this time, France, which had been
profiting significantly from its colony in Haiti, demanded that Haiti pay it
15

See VANHOOK, supra note 2, at 21.
See CIA, supra note 2.
17 Id.
18 History.com Editors, Louisiana Purchase, HIST., https://www.history.com/topics/
westward-expansion/louisiana-purchase (last updated June 6, 2019).
19 Id.
20 Erin Blakemore, The Louisiana Purchase Was Driven by a Slave Rebellion, HIST.,
https://www.history.com/news/louisiana-purchase-price-french-colonial-slave-rebellion (last
updated Aug. 23, 2018).
21 Id.
22 See History.com Editors, supra note 18.
23 United States and France conclude the Louisiana Purchase, HIST., https://www.
history.com/this-day-in-history/louisiana-purchase-concluded (last updated July 17, 2019).
24 Id.
25 Kelsey Gasseling, The Threads of Justice: Economic Liberalization and the
Secondhand Clothing Trade Between the U.S. and Haiti, 58 B.C.L. REV. 1279, 1298 (2017).
16
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reparations for loss of income and for the slaves’ freedom; otherwise France
threatened to invade the new nation26 and reinstitute slavery.27
In order to maintain its historic freedom, the 21-year-old nation decided
in 1825 to pay France’s demand of one hundred and fifty million gold
francs.28 In February 1838, France decreased the amount to ninety million
gold francs.29 Still, the damage was done. The total debt paid would
eventually equal $21 billion in today’s currency.30 This astounding total
includes not only the original principal but also the interest from loans that
Haiti had to take from French banks to pay the debt.31 The repayment of these
reparations, or the “independence debt,” created a financially devastating
process that did not end until 1947, 122 years after the initial payment.32 Over
the 122 years of repayment—which encompassed fundamental economic
development years—the annual payments for the debt sometimes equaled
about 80% of the new country’s gross domestic product, effectively
constraining any significant growth.33 Brian Concannon, Jr., founder and
executive director of the Institute for Justice and Democracy in Haiti,
summarized the lasting impact of the independence debt on the young nation:
“For an entire century, Haiti geared its economy to paying back the French
debt and missed out on industrialization, education, and development of its
government and democratic institutions. It really couldn’t develop.”34
B. Haiti’s Demonstrated Need: Rice Dumping and the Right to Food
The Haitian constitution protects a right to adequate food,35 but access
to food remains one of Haiti’s most pressing needs36 and violated rights. In
26

Id.
Blakemore, supra note 20.
28 H.P. DAVIS, BLACK DEMOCRACY: THE STORY OF HAITI 116-17 (photo. reprint 2007)
(Longmans, Green & Co 1928).
29 Id. at 118; see also Gasseling, supra note 25, at 1299.
30 Kim Ives, HAITI: Independence Debt, Reparations for Slavery and Colonialism, and
International “Aid”, GLOBAL RES. (May 10, 2013), https://www.globalresearch.ca/haitiindependence-debt-reparations-for-slavery-and-colonialism-and-international-aid/5334619.
31 DAVIS, supra note 28, at 118.
32 Ives, supra note 30.
33 Id.
34 Labrador, supra note 3; see also Gasseling, supra note 25, at 1299 (“This staggering
and longstanding debt encumbered Haiti’s process of economic development and
industrialization, thus preventing the nation from gaining a competitive foothold in the global
market.”) and Ives, supra note 30 (“After the debt was paid, Haitians were left with a
chronically undeveloped economy, rampant poverty, and a spent land — today relatively
minor environmental stresses like tropical storms cause catastrophic damage in vulnerable
Haiti.”).
35 The Right to Food Around the Globe, FAO, http://www.fao.org/right-to-food-aroundthe-globe/countries/hti/en/ (last visited Mar. 17, 2019).
36 Haiti: Deteriorating Economic State Impacts Humanitarian Situation, UNOCHA (Dec.
27,
2019),
https://www.unocha.org/story/haiti-deteriorating-economic-state-impactshumanitarian-situation [hereinafter Haiti: Economic State].
27
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fact, the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Human Affairs
(UNOCHA) predicts that in 2020, at least “4.6 million Haitians—about 40%
of the total population—will require urgent humanitarian assistance.”37
While the Haitian government’s handling of the economy is at fault38, they
were not solely responsible for this dire situation.
In his article, Cheaper, Better, Longer-Lasting: A Rights-Based
Approach to Disaster Response in Haiti, Brian Concannon Jr. succinctly
summarizes the origins of Haiti’s current agricultural woes.
In the 1980s, Haiti was a net exporter of agricultural produce. The
agricultural sector collapsed, however, after the International
Monetary Fund imposed structural adjustments in the 1980s and
1990s,
which
required Haiti to
decrease
subsidies
on
domestic rice and remove tariffs on imported staples.39 Under
pressure from the United States, Haiti also had to slash tariffs from
45-50 [%] down to 0-15 [%].40

In other words, the Haitian government was forced to stop providing its
own farmers with economic incentives to grow rice domestically, while
simultaneously slashing the taxes on imported rice that were meant to
encourage consumption of the domestically grown rice.41 Instead, local rice
became expensive to produce and sell, while U.S. producers were able to
flood the Haitian market with their cheaply made surplus of rice.42 Without
these protections, Haitian farmers could not compete with subsidized U.S.
agricultural goods, and imports from the United States flooded the Haitian
markets.43
The international trade practice known as dumping, thus, played out
in textbook format in Haiti.
[Dumping occurs when] a country or company exports a product at a
price that is lower in the foreign importing market than the price in
the exporter’s domestic market. Because dumping typically involves
substantial export volumes of a product, it often endangers the
financial viability of the product’s manufacturers or producers in the

37

Id.
Id; see also Brian Concannon, Jr. & Beatrice Lindstrom, Cheaper, Better, LongerLasting: A Rights-Based Approach to Disaster Response in Haiti, 25 EMORY INT’L L. REV.
1145, 1163-1164 (2011).
39 Brian Concannon, Jr. & Beatrice Lindstrom, Cheaper, Better, Longer-Lasting: A
Rights-Based Approach to Disaster Response in Haiti, 25 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 1145, 11631164 (2011) (footnote omitted).
40 Id.
41 Id.
42 Id.
43 Id.
38
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importing nation.44

The Food Security Act of 1985 (the “1985 U.S. Farm Bill”) was a fiveyear plan enacted “to extend and revise agricultural price support and related
programs, to provide for agricultural export, resource conservation, farm
credit, and agricultural research and related programs, to continue food
assistance to low-income persons, to ensure consumers an abundance of food
and fiber at reasonable prices, and for other purposes.”45 The Bill was
essentially created to stimulate the stagnant farming economy in the United
States, as illustrated by Title VI of the Bill which amended the Agricultural
Act of 1949 and authorized “(1) specified support reductions; (2) reduced
loan repayments; (3) deficiency payments; (4) acreage limitation, set-aside,
and land diversion programs; and (5) export marketing certificates” for rice
crops.46
Though the problematic policy predated his presidential term by nearly
a decade, Former President Bill Clinton stated in a 2010 Senate Committee
Hearing on Global Health Programs that this policy was a “mistake” that
exclusively benefited farmers in the United States.
Since 1981, the United States has followed a policy until the last year,
when we started rethinking it, that we rich countries that produce a lot
of food should sell it to poor countries and relieve them of the burden
of producing their own food, so that they can leap directly into the
industrial era. It has not worked. [It may have] been good for some of
my farmers in Arkansas, but it has not worked.
It was a mistake. It was a mistake that I was a party to. I am not
pointing the finger at anybody else. I have to live every day with the
consequences of the lost capacity to produce rice in Haiti [to feed
those people] because of what I did.47

Former President Clinton acknowledged these failures in March 2010.
Now, exactly a decade later, Haiti teeters on the edge of a severe food crisis
and its most vulnerable populations—women and children—will bear the
brunt of it.48
As if the economic consequences of these practices were not enough,
44 Dumping, INVESTOPEDIA, https://www.investopedia.com/terms/d/dumping.asp#ixzz
5XWK1rHS2 (last visited Feb. 4, 2019).
45 Food Security Act of 1985, H.R. 2100, 99th Cong., 99 Stat. 1354 (1985).
46 Summary: H.R.2100—99th Congress (1985-1986), CONGRESS.GOV, https://www.
congress.gov/bill/99th-congress/house-bill/2100 (last visited Feb. 20, 2020).
47 Building on Success: New Directions in Global Health: Hearing Before the Comm. on
Foreign Relations, 111th Cong. 9-10 (2010) (statement of Hon. William Jefferson Clinton,
Chairman, William J. Clinton Foundation), https://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/
doc/031010_Transcript_Building%20on%20Success%20New%20Directions%20in%20
Global%20Health.pdf.
48 Haiti: Economic State, supra note 36.
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there was at least one other side-effect. Because of the inability to make a
living in the countryside with farmland and produce, many unemployed
farmers and their families moved into Haiti’s cities—most notably the
Haitian capital of Port-au-Prince—where they expected to find work.49 This
migration is one of the contributing factors to Port-au-Prince’s severe
overpopulation.50 The overpopulation established a deadly setting for the
historic January 12, 2010 earthquake that all but demolished the city.51
Though the reports vary, the Haitian government estimated the death toll in
and around the city to be more than 300,000 lives.52 The large death toll was
attributed, at least in part, to Haiti’s either outdated or lack of building
codes.53This leads to Haiti’s need for the establishment of key infrastructure
and regulations, which is a substantial opportunity for outside investors.
According to a January 2008 memo regarding Haiti’s Inter-American
Development Bank loan exactly two years before the deadly earthquake,
“Haiti [had been] seeking international help to spur economic development
in the country. President René Préval submitted that the country’s poverty,
widespread unemployment, and the dilapidated state of infrastructure will be
alleviated with increased international assistance.”54 However, with regard to
foreign investments, Haiti still faces the challenge “to achieve a balance
between the need for foreign capital and the fear of foreign economic
domination.”55
III. CARIBBEAN AND U.S. TRADE LAWS FOR HAITI
Whether or not Haiti has fallen into further foreign economic
domination depends on the trade laws to which it is a subject or a party. There
have been at least four separate developments over the past few decades that
are currently regulating Haiti’s interaction with the global markets: the
Caribbean Basin Trade Partnership and its predecessor the Caribbean Basin
Initiative, the HELP Act, and the HOPE Act. There is also the Caribbean
Community Trade Agreement which regulates how Haiti interacts with the
Caribbean markets.56
49

Carl Lindskoog, What You’re Not Hearing about Haiti (But Should Be), COMMON
DREAMS (Jan. 14, 2010), https://www.commondreams.org/views/2010/01/14/what-yourenot-hearing-about-haiti-should-be.
50 Id.
51 Id.
52 Richard Pallardy, Haiti Earthquake of 2010, BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/
event/Haiti-earthquake-of-2010 (last updated Oct. 5, 2018).
53 Id.
54 HAITI: IDB Grants US $17.8MM Loan to Promote Rural Supply Chain (Jan. 20, 2008),
TROUBLED COMPANY REPORTER (Oct. 27, 2006), https://advance.lexis.com/api/permalink/
f16b46d9-c56a-490b-86d6-e406a8fb1cc9/? context=1000516.
55 Lewis D. Soloman & David H. Mirsky, Direct Foreign Investment in the Caribbean:
A Legal and Policy Analysis, 11 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 257, 259 (1990).
56 Haiti - Trade Agreements, SELECTUSA.GOV, https://www.selectusa.gov/article?id=
Haiti-Trade-Agreements (last updated Aug. 3, 2019).
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A. Caribbean Basin Trade Partnership Act (CBTPA)
On October 2, 2000, Haiti became a beneficiary of the Caribbean Basin
Trade Partnership Act (CBTPA),57 which was passed by Congress as part of
its Trade and Development Act of 200058 “to authorize a new trade and
investment policy for sub-Saharan Africa, expand trade benefits to the
countries in the Caribbean Basin, renew the generalized system of
preferences, and reauthorize the trade adjustment assistance programs.”59 As
such, the CBTPA is “designed to provide greater duty-free access to U.S.
market for Caribbean and Central American nations.”60 An important
predecessor of the CBTPA is the Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI). The CBI’s
primary goal is to “facilitate the development of stable Caribbean Basin
economies by providing beneficiary countries with duty-free access to the
U.S. market for most goods.” 61 According to the Haiti Commercial Guide
published by SelectUSA, an organization that facilitates business investment
in the United States, “the CBTPA expands on the CBI program by allowing
duty-free and quota-free treatment for imports of certain apparel from the
region and by extending NAFTA-equivalent tariff treatment to a number of
other products that were previously excluded from the CBI program.”62 The
current CBTPA agreement is set to expire on September 30, 2020.63
B. The HELP and HOPE Acts
In order to help Haiti became an active member in the apparel and textile
industry, Congress enacted the Haitian Hemispheric Opportunity through
Partnership Encouragement (HOPE) Act of 2006, which went into effect on
March 19, 2007.64 Congress provided HOPE in addition to other trade
preferences to create a holistic trade relationship; these include the
Generalized System of Preferences (GSP),65 Caribbean Basin Economic
57

Id.
See Trade and Development Act of 2000, H.R. 434, 106th Cong., 114 Stat 251 (2000).
59 Id.
60 Haiti - Trade Agreements, supra note 56.
61 Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI), OFF. OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE,
https://ustr.gov/issue-areas/trade-development/preference-programs/caribbean-basininitiative-cbi (last visited Feb. 4, 2019).
62 Haiti - Trade Agreements, supra note 56.
63 Id.
64 See Tax Relief and Health Care Act of 2006, H.R. 6111, 109th Cong., 120 Stat. 2922
(2006) (the HOPE Act is incorporated in Title V of this Act.).
65 See Trade Act of 1974, H.R. 10710, 93rd Cong., 88 Stat 1978 (1974); see also U.S.
CUSTOMS & BORDER PROT., GENERALIZED SYSTEM OF PREFERENCES (GSP),
https://www.cbp.gov/trade/priority-issues/trade-agreements/special-tradelegislation/generalized-system-preferences (Last updated February 26, 2020) (“The
Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) provides duty-free treatment to goods of designated
beneficiary countries. The program was authorized by the Trade Act of 1974 to promote
economic growth in the developing countries and was implemented on January 1, 1976.”).
58
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Recovery Act (CBERA),66 and CBTPA.67 According to the SelectUSA Haiti
Commercial Guide, “eligibility criteria for the HOPE Act includes progress
toward achieving a market-based economy, increasing employment,
enhancing the rule of law, eliminating barriers to U.S. trade, combating
corruption, and protecting internationally recognized human and worker
rights.”68 More recently, after the January 12, 2010 earthquake, imports of
apparel articles from Haiti to the United States in 2010 decreased by fortythree percent in comparison to 2009 according to estimates by the
Department of Commerce.69 As a result, the U.S. Congress passed the Haiti
Economic Lift Program (HELP) Act.70 The bill extends the CBTPA and the
HOPE Act through September 30, 2025.71
The SelectUSA Haiti Commercial Guide concludes that the unique
“trade preferences available under the HOPE and HELP Act are specifically
designed for Haiti and are conditioned on both the Haitian government and
individual producers meeting certain core labor standards and Haitian labor
laws.”72
IV. BALANCING FOREIGN PARTICIPATION WITH DOMESTIC
INDEPENDENCE
Foreign direct investments (FDIs) are one of Haiti’s options for
bolstering its infrastructure beyond its current state and for helping the
country engage with the global community on a more substantial level. FDIs
allow an investor to invest in another country while maintaining significant
control of the management and even operations of said investment.73
The IMF’s Balance of Payments Manual, fifth edition (BPM5) defines
FDI as a category of international investment that reflects the
objective of a resident in one economy (the direct investor) obtaining
a lasting interest in an enterprise resident in another economy (the
66

See Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act of 1983, H.R. 2973, 98th Cong., 97 Stat.
385 (1983); see also U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER PROT., CARIBBEAN BASIN ECONOMIC
RECOVERY ACT (CBERA), https://www.cbp.gov/trade/priority-issues/trade-agreements/
special-trade-legislation/caribbean-basin-initiative/cbera (Last modified: February 21, 2017)
(“The Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act (CBERA) was implemented on January 1,
1984, and has no set expiration date. CBERA generally provides for duty-free entry of goods
into the United States from designated beneficiary countries.”).
67 Trade and Development Act of 2000, supra note 58.
68 Haiti - Trade Agreements, supra note 56.
69 Id.
70 See Haiti Economic Lift Program Act of 2010, H.R. 5160, 111th Cong., 114 Stat 1194
(2010).
71 Haiti - Trade Agreements, supra note 56.
72 Id.
73 Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), CORPORATE FINANCIAL INSTITUTE, (Last visited:
April 17, 2020), https://corporatefinanceinstitute.com/resources/knowledge/economics/
foreign-direct-investment-fdi/.
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direct investment enterprise). The lasting interest implies the
existence of a long-term relationship between the direct investor and
the direct investment enterprise, and a significant degree of influence
by the investor on the management of the enterprise. A direct
investment relationship is established when the direct investor has
acquired 10 percent or more of the ordinary shares or voting power of
an enterprise abroad.74

According to Direct Foreign Investment in the Caribbean: A Legal and
Policy Analysis, there are, at minimum, three considerations for countries
when deciding to introduce FDIs:
1) how to attract foreign investment while keeping foreign ownership of domestic
resources to a minimum; 2) how to alleviate foreign investors’ concerns with respect
to their legal rights to repatriate capital and profits without incurring a damaging
drain of domestic foreign exchange resources; and 3) how to design their respective
tax systems in such a way as to simultaneously foster economic growth and attract
foreign investment while concurrently raising enough revenue to meet the budgetary
requirements of the central government.75

When Haiti attempts to create a domestic-foreign balance, it is checked
by the global community. In a July 2018 World Trade Organization (WTO)
meeting, the Dominican Republic and the United States questioned Haiti’s
decision to “modify tariff concessions and apply tariffs higher than the
bound levels in its WTO schedule of commitments.”76 This decision was
preceded by Haiti’s accession to the Caribbean Community Trade
Agreement (CARICOM).77 The Dominican Republic claimed that Haiti had
“not notified the WTO of the decision to impose a ban on the importation of
twenty-three products—mainly food and construction products.”78 The
Dominican Republic also posed that as a result global exports to Haiti had
decreased by forty-three percent since October 2015.79 Haiti acknowledged
the proposed problem, saying that “discussions on harmonizing its custom
tariff regime continue with the goal of fully engaging in intra-CARICOM
trade while also ensuring that its schedule of concessions is in full conformity
with WTO rules.”80
74 INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT TRENDS AND
STATISTICS: A SUMMARY, (2003), n.1, https://www.imf.org/External/np/sta/fdi/eng/2003/
102803s1.pdf.
75 Lewis D. Solomon & David H. Mirsky, Article: Direct Foreign Investment in the
Caribbean: A Legal and Policy Analysis, 11 NW. J. IN’T L. & BUS. 257, 259 (1990).
76 Members Raise Concerns Over US Section 232 Investigation on Automobiles and
Automotive Parts, WTO (July 3 & 4, 2018), https://www. https://www.wto.org/english/
news_e/news18_e/good_03jul18_e.htm.
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V. DEVELOPING ESSENTIAL INFRASTRUCTURE THROUGH
PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS
Before venturing any further into international trade, Haiti has massive
internal opportunities for development. P3s can potentially open the door to
FDIs. While FDIs will help enhance the private sector and those engaged in
it, the P3s would allow private investors, both foreign and domestic, to
partner on the construction of essential infrastructure, including Haiti’s
notoriously underdeveloped roads.81
Haiti has exhibited a need for consistent and regulated foreign investors.
This need is not just for finances but to bring in knowledge and to remedy, at
least in part, the human capital flight, or “brain drain” of the country.82
According to a 2010 report by the U.S. Census Bureau, Haitians as an
ancestry group in the United States have increased from “290,000 people . .
. (0.1% of the total population) in 1990 to 548,000 (0.2%) in 2000. By 2009,
an estimated [number of] 830,000 people . . . were living in the United States,
or 0.3% of the total U.S. population.”83 According to a 2006 report by the
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), “. . .
[an] estimated 80[%] of the college-educated Haitians now live outside the
country.”84 Besides Haitians fleeing during the Duvalier family dictatorship
of the 1960s and 1970s, brain drain is another external force that is drawing
talented and educated Haitians out of their country and its workforce.
A different form of brain drain has been the rather intense poaching
of Haitian talents by organizations and agencies of the international
community, including the United Nations where the issue of the
difference in salary scales between national institutions and foreign
agencies is a well-known world-wide phenomenon that has never
been addressed effectively.85

P3s can start to develop the infrastructure that foreign direct investors
will use to build up the workforce and that the country can then use to retain
and develop their talent. P3s between a government agency and a privatesector company can be used to finance, build, and operate projects, allowing
81 David Lick & Roger E. Hamlin, Public-Private Partnerships for Promotion of CrossBorder Trade and Transportation, 37 CAN.-U.S. L.J. 171, 171 (2012).
82 Whitney Joseph, The Effects of Brain Drain on Haiti, U. MARYLAND MCNAIR
SCHOLARS UNDERGRADUATE RES. J. no. 3, 2011, at 145, 145, https://drum.lib.umd.edu/
bitstream/handle/1903/12464/Joseph.pdf;jsessionid=F0A11B212C1B3E288BB09E1696BD
8224?sequence=1.
83 ANGELA B. BUCHANAN, NORA G. ALBERT & DANIEL BEAULIEU, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
THE POPULATION WITH HAITIAN ANCESTRY IN THE UNITED STATES: 2009 (Oct. 2010),
https://www.census.gov/library/publications/2010/ acs/acsbr09-18.html.
84 CAROL FAUBERT, UNDP EVALUATION OFF., EVALUATION OF UNDP ASSISTANCE TO
CONFLICT-AFFLICTED COUNTRIES | CASE STUDY: HAITI (2006), https://www.oecd.org/
countries/haiti/44826404.pdf.
85 Id.

376

Establishing Economic Independence in Haiti
40:363 (2020)

a project to be completed sooner or making it a possibility in the first place.
The partnership is, of course, mutually beneficial: the city receives the
funding for the project, as well as the completed infrastructure, while the
private company may decide to receive the operating profits once the project
is complete.86
One of the most important pieces of infrastructure that could use
investment and development is Haiti’s transportation system, particularly its
roads. The country is fortunately making progress in this area. The World
Bank and Haitian government collaborated to develop the country’s Nord
(North) region and as a result, opened up a new road in February 2018 at the
request of the government.87 The eight-kilometer ride from the village of
Labadie to downtown Cap Haïtien used to take ninety minutes; now, this new
road shortens the journey by a third of that time.88 The road, a modern and
beautiful touch of needed urban efficiency, lays smoothly along the coast
between the unspoken beauty of Haiti’s picturesque beaches and forested
mountain ranges.89 Merline Pierre, a student from Labadee, attends school in
Cap Haïtien. Her journey consists of a walk from her home—a boat—where
she takes a ferry ride across clear blue waters to Cap Haïtien, and then takes
a tap tap to school.90 The road, she says, used to be bad, filled with rocks, and
people would often get sick on the route.91 Now it takes her just twenty to
twenty-five minutes.92 Jean Oril, tap tap driver and President of the Labadee
Transport Union, states that prior to the constructed road, there would never
be any rides after four in the afternoon, which was extremely inefficient and
highly dangerous in the case of medical emergencies.93 Previously, they were
only able to transport at a maximum fifteen people for a daily total of three
trips.94 The total amount of rides per day has since increased 167%.95 “This
is a great asset for the North,” Oril says, “it will help develop the area a lot.”96
Fritz Caillot, Haitian Minister of Public Works, Transports, Communication
and Energy, agrees. He states that the road is very important for development
and that by development, he also means tourism, but for that to happen, they
still require fundamental infrastructure such as water, energy, and more
86 Public-Private Partnerships, INVESTOPEDIA, https://www.investopedia.com/terms/p/
public-private-partnerships. asp (last visited Feb. 20, 2020).
87 It All Starts With a Road: The Key to Mobility in Haiti, THE WORLD BANK,
https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/feature/2018/02/28/tout-commence-par-une-route-lacle-de-la-mobilite-en-haiti (last Updated Aug. 22, 2018).
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roads.97 Additionally, the residents in the communities along the road have
shared that since construction commenced, they no longer feel threatened by
rain, which often led to flooding.98 Channels and drainage works have been
undertaken and retaining walls have been constructed to prevent landslides.99
A. Mechanisms of A Meaningful Public-Private Partnership
Isabel Marques de Sá, Chief Investment Officer of International Finance
Corporation at the World Bank Group, states that P3s ideally “bring private
sector competencies, efficiencies, and capital to improving public assets or
services when governments lack the upfront cash.”100 P3s can be monumental
in helping develop key infrastructure—power, ports, airports, water and
waste treatment and more—and can encompass three stages of
implementation: investment, operation, and maintenance. As such, P3s are
also beneficial in stimulating economic development.
The strength of P3s, however, can also be their weakness as the total
expenditure can actually exceed that of direct public procurement since P3s
may appeal to investors only if the public pays for the actual cost of the
project as well as a profit for the private partners. While the practice of P3s
has been traced back to fifteenth century Italian city-states, the current model
“is effective for high-cost, high-visibility projects that involve social and
technical complexities, with the potential to build in synergies, develop
competencies, and create an effective framework for alliances and
cooperation, especially when community stakeholders and experts are
involved from the start.”101
P3s are typically complex long-term projects that can span anywhere
from fifteen to twenty years, and potentially even more. In that time, many
factors can change, including, without limitation, politics, technology, the
environment, and demographics. Therefore, the contract establishing the
partnership needs to be artfully and thoughtfully structured to account for any
potential changes. This includes having both incentives and penalties to
encourage compliance throughout the duration of the contract.102
P3s are also highly political because they are agreements between the
government and the private sector. However, while private entities’
leadership and goals will likely remain relatively stable for a long period of
time, governments will experience regular (and sometimes not-so-regular)
97
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changes in leadership and the policies they seek to advance. This type of
unpredictable change, especially in countries that are seen as politically
unstable, causes private companies to require more assurances that the deal—
and more importantly, the payment—will be ensured regardless of the
political landscape. As such, “[i]nvestors seek protection against such risks
through guarantees, sometimes backed by a multilateral, international
arbitration for dispute resolution and higher returns on equity.”103 On the
other hand, the public sector also requires protection from the private
sector.104 This protection can come in the form of performance guarantees
that may either be unlimited or capped.105
Overall, as the saying goes, “you can catch more flies with honey than
with vinegar.” It is better to have the contract primarily governed by
incentives than penalties so both parties are encouraged to see it to
completion.106
B. Navigating the Complexities of Public-Private Partnership
There are a number of potential pitfalls to be cautious of when designing
a P3. Marques de Sá warns that P3s are quite complex and that around fifty
percent of proposed projects fail. “That is the nature of the business,”107 she
writes. Because P3s are such complex structures, they touch upon many
fields of expertise–accounting, taxes, economics, engineering, environment,
finance, law–and often require the input of professionals in those fields. The
projects usually move forwards slowly at first, being introduced in stages.
Usually, engineering and economics are established first, then financial and
legal achievability, and finally the political aspects and integration with the
desires of the private sector.108
One of the major challenges of the successful completion of a P3 comes
from managing the requests of main stakeholders.109 Much negotiation and
consensus are required on both sides throughout the duration of the planning,
though private sector considerations are typically brought in during the later
stages, which is when they are invited to comment on the draft agreements.
Projects can fail when there are unresolvable differences, such as the
government refusing to provide certain guarantees or an unacceptable
allocation of risk. These can be deal breakers because the primary point is
that P3s need to be financed so bankability is critical. In order to have that,
the agreement must allocate risks properly. The financial tools that are
103
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available for financing are ever developing, though Marques de Sá says that
project bonds for middle-income markets are gaining traction, while regions
that have a lot of liquidity have the active participation of local banks. In
some developing countries, the local private banks are not able to provide
long-term financing, so they may rely on leveraging or utilizing
organizations, such as the World Bank’s International Financial Corporation
or other similar entities.110
In addition to the considerations of the public and private sectors, certain
projects also require intense and thorough consideration of the region’s
population.111 Some groups may be displaced or temporarily adversely
impacted by a project.112 It is important for the government in particular to
be transparent and clearly communicate early and often about the goals of
the project and the realities of its implementation, otherwise there can be
serious social and political effects.113
The affordability to users and the government is another key
consideration that organizers do not always understand. Governments tend
to build these structures based on population sizes or a usability rate that will
not manifest anytime soon. While the governments are planning ahead, the
costs are immediate. As such, special attention must be given to demand
analysis and costing to give the project the best shot at viability.114
There is currently no universal manner of implementing P3s because
every project involves a different government, sector, and set of private
partners, among other variables. There are so many variables that, while there
are standard best practices for the legal clauses, everything else is specific to
the situation at hand. The feasibility of a P3 depends on the parties involved
and what terms are reasonable to them. As previously stated, every market
and country have their own risks and considerations. The risks may not
always be worth the cost. That is up to the stakeholders to decide. Some
environments may require more creative financing, drafting and
implementation. A P3 can also be done in stages or address a sub issue
instead. Marques de Sá shares the example of how Liberia’s electric system
had been destroyed following their civil war, which ended in 2003. Instead
of taking on the colossal risk of rebuilding the entire system, private
institutions decided to instead commit to training electricity technicians and
rehabilitating one of their electric plants with one entering into a management
contract.115 Part of this was made possible by the creation of the Rural
Renewable Energy Agency and the passage of Liberia Electricity Law, both
in 2015, which created an avenue to allow private sector involvement for the
110
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first time.116 This highlights the overall principle that P3s need a government
champion in order to have enough power to survive negotiations.
C. Public-Private Partnerships in Action
P3s have been created at the state level in the United States, with the
Pennsylvania Rapid Bridge Replacement Project being one of the more
ambitious undertakings in the past few years. The Pennsylvania Department
of Transportation (PennDOT) enacted a P3 to replace 558 of the state’s aging
or structurally deficient bridges, “a first-of-its-kind bundling of the work for
multiple bridges into one massive project under a single procurement.”117
The National Council for Public-Private Partnerships boasts that this
Pennsylvania project had already set many precedents before it even began:
it is Pennsylvania’s first transportation P3, the nation’s first multi-asset
availability payment concession, and the first project in which the developer
won approval through the Federal Highway Administration’s Special
Experimental Project program to conduct the environmental process.118
According to John Schmidt, a partner and leading P3 attorney with Mayer
Brown LLP, Pennsylvania’s “innovative use of P3 structure for multiple
bridges has potential value as precedent in other areas.”119 As of April 18,
2018, PennDOT has completed 400 of the 558 bridges. It attributes the speed
and efficiency of the repairs to its unique relationship with Plenary Bridge
Keystone Partners, which is receiving $889 million to replace the bridges and
maintain them for twenty-five years. Previous contracting methods would
have taken PennDOT up to twelve years to complete all the bridges,120 which
speaks to the efficiency benefit of P3s.
The type of investors that a country draws can depend on how the
country’s market is classified. Market classification systems typically vary
between indexers and benchmarks and change based on the indicators that
are used by the governing body issuing the status. However, there are
sweeping generalizations that may assist with basic categorization. The
World Bank considers a country’s economy, particularly its relative wealth
per capita.121 Thus, countries with the highest relative wealth per capita are
116
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classified as developed countries. A few examples of developed countries are
the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany, and Japan.
From there, countries with low, middle, and upper-middle incomes per
capita, relative to incomes in other countries around the globe, are classified
as developing or emerging. The Modern Index Strategy, or MSCI, is an
indexing system that allows investors to make informed decisions through
their analysis of world markets and the full equity opportunity set.122 MSCI
examines each country’s economic development, liquidity, size and market
accessibility in determining the market classification.123 Therefore, when the
MSCI grants a country the “emerging market” label it signals to active and
passive funds that use the MSCI Emerging Markets index as a benchmark
that they can invest in companies listed in that country, potentially resulting
in significant foreign investment.124 According to the MSCI, there were
twenty-four emerging markets as of June 2018, including Brazil, Chile,
Colombia, Egypt, Greece, Russia, and the United Arab Emirates.125
Countries with even lower levels of income per capita are categorized
as frontier markets. Frontier markets tend to have stock markets that are more
volatile and less diverse, and the companies have poorer levels of corporate
governance. Because of politics, development, demographics, and liquidity,
frontier markets may be seen as less mature than emerging markets and thus
more of an investment risk. As of the June 2018 MSCI Index, twenty-nine
counties were frontier markets, including Argentina, Croatia, Jordan, Kenya,
Nigeria, and Vietnam.126
In 2013, Haiti’s then Minister of Finance and Economy Marie Carmelle
Jean Marie announced that Haiti sought to grow from a frontier market to an
emerging market by 2030. Its goals, she stated, were to “restore public
finances and attract investment, including from foreign companies.”127 P3s
were lauded as key in achieving the new status as they would bring in
knowledge and money to implement essential infrastructures. However, Jean
Marie acknowledged Haiti’s personal responsibility in creating a country and
economic system that would attract investors. “We have to convince
investors that we can manage our own domestic resources with efficacy and
transparency,”128 she stated. This lack of accountability caused Canada to
122
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freeze its official aid to Haiti for a period of time in 2013, citing a lack of
accountability.129 When paired with accountability, efficacy and
transparency, P3s can be an effective tool in a government’s quest to
economic freedom.
VI. ANTI-CORRUPTION MEASURES AS AN ASSURANCE FOR
INVESTORS
Corruption is by far Haiti’s largest problem, and it will have to be
meaningfully addressed in order for investors to seriously and comfortably
consider it as a viable investment option. Substantially reforming a corrupt
government is possible; just look to Brazil. For several decades, the largest
country in South America has been the setting for some of the most pervasive
corruption on the continent. Ready to usher in a new era of accountability,
security, and stability, Brazil drastically changed its landscape when it passed
the Clean Company Act 2014.
Brazil’s Clean Company Act 2014 (Law No. 12,846) holds companies
responsible for the corrupt acts of their employees and introduces
strict liability for those offences, meaning a company can be liable
without a finding of fault. The Act provides strict civil and
administrative penalties but no criminal penalties for companies.
However, the Criminal Code establishes domestic criminal offences.
Prohibited conduct includes financing, paying or subsidizing the
performance of a prohibited act; bid rigging and fraud in public
procurement; and direct/indirect acts of bribery/attempted bribery of
Brazilian public officials/foreign public officials. Penalties for
companies under the Act include fines of up to 20% of a company’s
gross revenue from the previous year or suspension or dissolution of
a company. Importantly, prosecutors are not required to prove a
company’s representatives acted with criminal or corrupt intent, and
companies are not afforded a legal defense for implementing
‘adequate procedures’ to prevent corrupt acts.130

According to Transparency International’s report, about one in three
people who use public services in certain Latin American and Caribbean
countries paid a bribe during the past year.131 An estimated ninety million
people are expected to have paid bribes across twenty countries, which
included Brazil, Colombia, the Dominican Republic, Jamaica, Mexico,
Venezuela, and others.132 Of those that had paid bribes, men and women
129
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responded in almost equal numbers, as did the wealthy and the poor.133
However, because impoverished people have fewer disposable resources,
paying bribes creates more of a strain on them.134 In Brazil, bribes were paid
relatively equally across the board for all services: schools, hospitals,
identification documents, utilities, police, and courts.135
Despite these disappointing numbers across the region, seventy-four
percent of Brazilians believe that it is socially acceptable to report a case of
corruption;136 still, only about nine percent of all Caribbean citizens surveyed
have actually reported corruption.137 For many, it appears that the benefits of
holding corrupt officials accountable do not outweigh the risks of doing so.
Twenty-eight percent of those who reported corruption experienced
retaliation,138 which is understandable as nearly half of all respondents said
that most or all police and politicians were corrupt.139 As a result of the study
and their work, Transparency International made clear recommendations
and goals for countries seeking true justice and freedom from corruption:
This is why we are calling on governments in this region to reduce
corruption in the police force and strengthen judicial systems, so that
investigations can be conducted to the highest standards, judges made
independent and professional, and the courts system adequately
resourced to deal with corruption complaints. Whistleblower
protection laws must be strictly enforced, and safe reporting
mechanisms need to be created so that people who make a complaint
are not at risk. Only then will citizens have the confidence to report
an incident of corruption, safe in the knowledge that the perpetrator
will face justice.140

A. Brazil as a Model for Wide-Spread Corruption Reform
Brazil’s corruption reform is multipronged: its reach goes beyond the
federal level and its successful enforcement is more than just effective
legislation. The Clean Company Act gives authorities and agencies at the
local, state, and federal level the power to independently interpret and enforce
the law.141 Proper enforcement of this powerful act requires buy-in and
cooperation from every level of the government. This new cohesion has been
displayed best in the investigation and prosecution of what has become the
133
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largest corruption scandal not only in Brazil, but in the world. Codenamed
“Operation Car Wash,” this corruption investigation launched in March 2014
with an inspection into agents known as doleiros—also known as black
market money dealers—who deceptively utilized petrol stations, car washes,
and an assortment of other small businesses to “launder the profits of
crime.”142 As far as corruption investigations go, Operation Car Wash started
innocuously enough, but a law that was meant to hold regular businesses
accountable ended up taking law enforcement much higher than they could
have imagined, right to the door of one of the largest companies in the world:
Petrobras.143
A portmanteau of Petroleum and Brazil, Petrobras is Brazil’s national
oil company and became the window into a previously unseen level of
corruption.
Petrobras was no ordinary company. As well as having the highest
market valuation (and the largest debts) of any corporation in Latin
America, it was a flagship for an emerging economy that was trying
to tap the biggest oil discovery of the 21st century – huge new oil
fields in deep waters off the coast of Rio de Janeiro. Petrobras
accounted for more than an eighth of all investments in Brazil,
providing hundreds of thousands of jobs in construction firms,
shipyards and refineries, and forming business ties with international
suppliers including Rolls-Royce and Samsung Heavy Industries.144

Operation Car Wash found that the doleiros were essentially illicit
intermediaries for a Petrobras executive and that the company was
overpaying on contracts to certain companies where agreements had been
formed to assure that their contractors were “guaranteed business on
excessively lucrative terms if they agreed to channel a share of between 1%
and 5% of every deal into secret slush funds. After diverting millions of
dollars into those funds, Petrobras directors then used them to funnel money
to the politicians who had appointed them in the first place, and to the
political parties they represented.”145 Every person connected to the deals
received bribes in forms that were not limited to cash, including luxury items
like wine, yachts, and helicopters. Petrobras as a company was so central to
the Brazilian economy and intertwined with this scandal that “as the Car
Wash investigation was to prove, if you could unravel the secrets of this
company, you would unravel the secrets of the state.”146
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However, it is widely known that this level of prosecution—which now
includes even former Presidents—would be virtually impossible were it not
for legislative changes that Brazil made only a few years prior. Dilma
Rousseff succeeded Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva as leader of the Brazil’s
Workers’ Party and advanced to become president of the country’s coalition
government following the 2010 election.147 In the midst of 2013’s nationwide
anti-corruption demonstrations, Rousseff quickly attempted to regain peace
by fast-tracking laws aimed at eradicating systemic fraud.148 The new
measures included allowing plea bargaining: prosecutors could now make
deals with suspects, reducing their sentences in return for information that
could lead to the arrest of more important figures—a first in Brazil’s
history.149 This change became crucial in cultivating the cooperation of key
suspects, leading to the discovery of the high-level corruption scheme and
the prosecution of those suspects for their wrongdoings.150
B. Applying Brazil’s Lessons to Haiti
Brazil can be a case study for Haiti on how to curb corruption and
positively influence the national attitude on it. Brazil has not hesitated to
bring charges against even its President, showing that no one is above the
law. This operation and its success have also served as a signal to investors
that their deals and investments will be both honored and secured. For these
reasons, Haiti must take steps to follow Brazil’s example and overthrow its
culture of corruption if it hopes to cultivate an environment of stability and
security that will attract investors.
Haiti, whose Corruptions Perceptions Index score placed it near the
bottom of the list in a four-way tie with Burundi, Uzbekistan and
Zimbabwe,151 is making progress.
In 2012, La Fondation Héritage pour Haïti (LFHH), the Haiti chapter
of Transparency International (TI), in partnership with the Office of
the Inspector General (OIG) of USAID, launched a new anticorruption Hotline to prevent fraudulent and corrupt practices within
the programs and projects funded by the United States Agency for
International Development (USAID) in Haiti.152
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The hotline is to allow victims or witnesses of corruption within these
projects to report said crimes and initiate an investigation by the OIG of
USAID. Additionally, in October 2018, Roger Richard Boncy, an American
businessman of dual U.S. and Haitian citizenship, was charged with “one
count of conspiracy to violate the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act and the
Travel Act, one count of violating the Travel Act, and one count of
conspiracy to commit money laundering.”153 His co-conspirator, a retired
U.S. Army colonel, was also charged with the same crimes.154 They were
both arrested and indicted for a plan to bribe a high-level foreign official in
connection with a proposed $84 million port development project in Haiti.155
The plan also included money laundering, as the accused told undercover
agents posing as potential investors that they would funnel the payments
through a non-profit organization that Boncy owned and managed. The duo
also discussed getting a high-ranking official’s aide a job on the project in
exchange for the official’s help in getting the project approved. This case is
truly international in nature: the project is based in Haiti, the corporation
through which the money was to be laundered was based in Maryland, and
the communications which orchestrated the plan took place in a hotel in
Boston, while one of the defendants lives in Spain.156 Though this matter is
being prosecuted by the United States, Haiti’s cooperation in the resolution
displays a desire to increase transparency in international and domestic
business dealings.
However, Haiti’s recent stance against corruption has resulted in one of
the largest and most violent protest movements in its history. The streets of
the island country erupted in protest during the summer of 2018 upon the
revelation that the Haitian government had misappropriated more than $3.8
billion from the PetroCaribe oil alliance.
PetroCaribe is an agreement initiated by the government of Venezuela
to provide preferential payment arrangement for petroleum and
petroleum products to select Caribbean and Latin American countries.
Venezuela offers oil agreements to member countries, which must pay
60 percent of the bill within 90 days. The remaining 40 percent can be
financed over 25 years at 1 percent interest, should oil prices stay
above $40 per barrel. Financing takes into account the current cost of
oil, allowing for more favorable terms when the cost of oil is higher.
Countries may also offer goods and services to pay off oil shipments,
153
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ranging from food such as beans and sugar to human capital such as
doctors.157

The money resulting from the PetroCaribe agreement was to be used
“for infrastructure and social and economic projects.”158 Several audits have
shown that it is either unclear where the PetroCaribe funds went or the money
was mismanaged.159 Haitian President Jovenel Moise pledged to open an
investigation into the use of the funds and promised to bring those
responsible for any wrongdoing to justice,160 though the people are
simultaneously calling for his resignation. The largest protests with that cry
ironically occurred on November 18, a national holiday celebrating the 215th
anniversary of the battle of Vertieres: “a major victory for Haiti’s slaves in
the war for independence against the French army.”161 These protests even
took on a different tone as some people flew the black and red version of the
Haitian flag, which was replaced with the official blue and red flag following
the forced departure of dictator Jean Claude Duvalier.162 During these
protests, the cries of the people and those of Transparency are the same: “We
want justice!”163
VII. CURRENT FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENTS IN HAITI
Haiti already has at least one example of a successful FDI. People may
be surprised to learn that global beer brand Heineken has a majority
ownership in the Haitian brewery Brasserie Nationale d’Haiti (BRANA) and,
in the spirit of responsible corporate partnership, is “committed to being a
partner for growth for the nation.”164 Heineken had been a minority owner
since the 1970s but increased its stake to nearly 100% after the January 2010
earthquake, which knocked the plant offline for two months.165 Heineken was
impressed by Haiti’s popular lager beer Prestige and carbonated malt
157
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beverage Malta H. The beer maker engaged in an expansion project that has
benefits for both the company, its workers, and the Haitian economy.166
Seeing the opportunity for development, they embarked on a $100 million
renovation. The investment allows Heineken to significantly increase their
local production capacity, enabling a forty percent rise in the volume of beer
they produce in Haiti. The expansion program has included the addition of
four 3,000-hectoliter fermenters and a Maische Filter, which is a particularly
relevant addition, as it will allow them to use more locally sourced sorghum
to brew their beers.167 Their strategy in the country also includes two more
prongs.
[T]he investment doesn’t stop here. At the heart of our ‘Brewing a
Better Future’ initiative is our commitment to empower the
communities in which we operate, with much focus on local sourcing
– we believe that this will benefit not only our business, but also the
livelihoods of Haiti’s agricultural workers. As part of this project, we
have publicly stated our goal to locally source at least 20% of all raw
materials for our brewed products from the region. Partnerships such
as these are key to the success of our sustainability initiatives.
Together with USAID, we work to coordinate local sourcing with
local Haitian farmers through the Smallholder Farmers Alliance for
Sorghum in Haiti (SMASH) project and other farming cooperatives.
Addressing issues such as poor soil quality, effective seed
germination and efficient harvest yields, SMASH was created to
provide smallholder farmers with training in modern agricultural
techniques and guarantee buyers for its produce. As a result, farmers
have effectively doubled their crop yields for sorghum, a grain widely
harvested in Haiti and particularly important in the production of
Malta H. This represents a promising step forward not only for our
business, but also for the region’s local economy.168

In a 2015 Bloomberg News Special, farmers stated that their crops have
developed more in the past year as a result of them using the more efficient
farming techniques taught to them by Heineken.169 Heineken buys the
sorghums directly from the farmers and transports the sorghum to the
brewery in city for the farmers, reducing their travel time and giving them
more time to farm and better their practices.170 “It’s all pieces of one big
puzzle. Ultimately, we need to get this economy going. Farmers who earn
more money will be consumers on the other side,” said then Heineken CFO
René Hooft Graafland in the special.171 “[They will] not only drink more
166
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beer, [but] buy more soap [and] they will buy more soup. They will buy stuff.
So, this will be a bigger market as the economy gets better.”172
VIII. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, Haiti’s natural resources, gorgeous island scenery and
climate, large workforce, and ability to navigate the Caribbean and world
markets makes it a prime candidate for the support of foreign investors. The
country admittedly has much work to do with respect to its anti-corruption
laws and regulations. By making such improvements, companies may feel
more comfortable entering the market in public-private partnerships, which
will allow for the development of key infrastructure, the lack of which is
keeping the country in a perpetual state of poverty. Once key infrastructures
such as roads, transportation systems, electricity, internet, and water are
developed, foreign investors can come in to stimulate the private sector
through foreign direct investments. These partnerships have the ability to
transform that landscape of Haiti and allow it to be the leader in areas where
it currently lacks such as medical services, technology, and education.
One of the largest sources of wealth for Haiti is its people. Creative,
resilient, hardworking, and plentiful, the vast numbers of citizens are waiting
to be more and to do more, which can be a major allure for companies.
However, the Haitian government must try something new and actually
protect their citizens with actively enforced labor laws and an increased
minimum wage that does not keep people hovering just above the poverty
line with the potential to slip back under it at any point in time, goals which
are furthered by the HOPE and HELP Acts. The enforcement of these laws
and others will allow healthy competition, encourage innovation among the
untapped and currently suppressed population, and ensure Haiti’s glory days
are not behind it; they are ahead of it. Haiti is open for business and you are
invited to join.
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